tv Book TV After Words CSPAN February 12, 2011 10:00pm-11:00pm EST
they could not get what to impress what they were doing. we can save ourselves the mission introduced exit the resource of the region and securities of the political cecile aspects of the classification program could occur. we felt the mission was performed. the south vietnamese said so but also i want to tell you the north vietnamese said so. the classified top-secret documents of a family shouldn't surprise you. they were legal of the place to read everything we did, they knew, everything they did the south of the enemy's new. this is what the north vietnamese had to say about the period we are talking about to be the general offense uprising of 67, 69. they committed to a strategy and launched the strategy.
the point i want you to know more than anything is it was very successful in the pacification. comment by general westmoreland of the army this is what he had to say in 1991. what sets it apart is not only totally dominated the enemy, over a period of months and unheard of feet of honor. but i've been telling you about is an interesting read a how-to cockfight the guerrilla warfare in the delta terrie >> any questions? >> my husband was in the delta. he the 180 airmobile us stultz. to my question is she has always wanted to find out with the fate of the tiger scout is, just the
night division or the army or anybody ever keep up? >> de do knott unfortunately because we took the tigers coach from 1975 and the north vietnamese took over. i hope the fate was not good but i worry about them. they were there from 73 to 75. the awful time we pulled people out of vietnam we pull people out of saigon and some of the troops that we had the had tattooed on their arms kill communists, and i wonder what happened to those people. but i knew could you know some of my friends are put in the camp for 18 years. what happened is the tiger scouts is a good question. i wish i knew. but i'm sure they treated them harshly because they were people who surrendered and then fought back. any other questions? >> thank you very much for your time. [applause] this event was part of the annual association of the u.s.
army meeting. for more information, visit ausa.org. coming up next, book tv presents "after words," an hourlong program where we invite a guest hosts to interview authors. this week, a global intelligence expert george friedman discusses his latest book, "the next decade." and at the former political science professor recalls the u.s. an imperialist power the will be forced to reduce the dominance. the author of the next hundred years predicts china and turkey will challenge the remaining superpower in the coming decade in ways the government may not currently anticipate. he talks with the exit is editor of foreign policy magazine, susan glasser. >> host: george, thank you so much.
i'm glad to have the chance to talk to you in him that about your new book. i see that it represents a little bit of what's the right word, the narrowing of the frame of ambition from alaska on the next 100 years, you have now taken on perhaps a slightly more manageable next ten years or perhaps that is more unknowable, the next ten years. i think we can talk about that over the next hour, and some of your very counter intuitive views about what direction you see the world headed, and in particular the u.s. encounters with that world, whether it's on israel or her china and your view or russia. i can to have interesting things to say that are not exactly what you're going to pick up from reading the papers every day. let's go ahead and jump right into that conversation. the next ten years. what are the three most surprising to take away is that you are offering people in this book?
>> guest: first is the war on terror has been overdone not as terrorism as the danger but a monochromatic structure of foreign policy. it simply is unsustainable. there are too many other things happening in the world. the second i suppose is that china has profound economic problems at this point. it's grown magnificent and it will continue to grow, but it's going to go through an adjustment. but i suppose the most important thing and are giving is the next ten years is really about the relationship of what i called the empire of republic between the vast global power of the united states. the difficulty in managing that entertaining republican forms. eisenhower spoke about the political military-industrial complex and going beyond that i'm saying that the requirement
of managing the international system which we are only global power. with the institutions that we have, the complexity of the intelligence organizations created the situation no one has a clear idea of what everyone is doing. aside from creating unnecessary chaos of the world, it creates real challenges for the republic to maintain a space society in the face of this accumulating not transmitted power. so i would say those three things are the counter intuitive. the word balancing is a word that appears a lot in the course of the book when. in many areas of the world is this question of what course is the u.s. going to chart, are we going to adopt for lack of a better word a more realistic approach to some of these challenges better than the direct interventions that we've undertaken the last decade.
you point out in fact the united states has been in the war 100% of the time of the 21st century as opposed to the conflict some of the 20th century which amounted to i believe you said 17% of the time so are we going to find a way to back out of these wars? >> guest: we have to find it of backing out of the wars without backing out of the responsibility of the area. i said at one point of the book the balance of power is for the foreign policy and the domestic policy and is the founding principal of the empire. and i'm not going to compare the united states to the spot, nazi germany, napoleon tried to rule by a main force. it doesn't work very well. the romans, the british, the persians ruled supplely and in directly and by managing various players and controlling them and bringing you to the point where it wanted that.
>> host: subtlety up until now hasn't been the hallmark however. >> guest: we are a very young the country and it's only been 20 years since roosevelt global power in the december 31st, 1991 as the break point of history. first, the first moment in which 500 years there was no european global power. and second was the moment of which the united states quite by surprise was stunned that it happened, and it takes time to build institutions and takes time to build political culture. it's not surprising the first ten years that in the history we weren't going to have any wars. suddenly 9/11 happened and was about the long war that would never end in the islamic world. the united states is off balance. it didn't expect to be and this is the unintended empire, it didn't expect to be in this is enormously powerful position. it doesn't really know how to manage it, and this is the
decade -- this is the third decade we are in that it must come to terms with the incredible strains of the international system but also the domestic system. >> host: in a way i'm struck by how your argument about the need for the new diplomacy and new institutions to go along with it that would be the agent of the sort of rebalancing. there isn't the sense that we are two decades into the problem of building the post cold war. if anything that project is put on hold or perhaps to have gone in a wrong direction by the retraining of the american foreign policy as a global war and terror over the last decade. >> guest: the british as they served on their entire would devastate the counter insurgency and north america where they were defeated the germans to cut their heads handed to them by
the germans. it's not uncommon for a great imperial systems as they emerge first to be totally aware they are an imperial system and a second come to suffer serious reverses. they tend to be empathetic as soon as we encounter a serious problem we declare that we are still years. the first step of the process is at that and what we are and for the united states that meeting we are an employer is extraordinary difficulty and we are the first grade and high imperial project of the american revolution. we have been one to avoid foreign tangles and argued europe is not ever business. a large number of people feel that we should disengage. >> host: again, that's something that hasn't gone away. that's not a historical
artifact. that's going to be in increasingly live tv over the next two years. >> guest: but it's this meeting that you can't disengage. the united states is 25% of the world economy. how do you disengage from the rest of the world with everything you do and intended and intended as a devastating potential or great reward for some region of the world. we put quotas on the project large numbers of people are either celebrated or cry and this is the problem. institutions are not really aware of the problems. the president's office is not always aware of what everyone is doing. and the public is unaware of how dependent they are on these relationships for their own well-being. so there is a lack of awareness both in the institutions and the political culture of the
necessities of these relationships but we like to imagine we could have the benefits but all of the nasty responsibilities with oa. >> host: increasingly that's the dialogue you see taking place between the u.s. and china for example which is to say china is probably running for the end of its course making the argument hay we are simply a developing country. we can't afford to bear the burden of the international leadership of the united states has been paying. china wants to be recognized as the second-largest economy of the world growing towards being at some point in the next couple decades the largest economy in the world. at some point those conversations are going to meet come and the question of who pays the bill for the global leadership and what is required in order to sustain that is going to come up, but i want to back up. december 31st, 1991 he recalled a great point in history, collapsed the soviet union is what happened on that day and both the post-soviet era not
only in american foreign policy but in terms of literally read writing the world as we knew it. two decades later we're going to mark the anniversary this year. things haven't necessarily turned out as the optimists would have had them. we hadn't seen a tidal wave of democracy and freedom wash across central asia and russia itself. quite the contrary. in many ways we see nationals and new conflicts break out and the exhortations when it comes to what kind of political economic and social system it's going to be existing across the reform of the soviet union. i want to walk through the map of the world to decades after. if you have some views that are very controversial and make some unexpected or perhaps set predictions that some of the readers won't necessarily know what to make of.
washington itself -- russia itself, tell me where you see russia headed in the next decade. >> guest: russia is russia. it's not a copy of the jfk school. russia for 200 years has had at its center the security system under the soviets. a around the security system the states grew up around the state grew up and relations throughout the country, partly market relationships and a state-controlled relationships. russia is not the united states and is never going to resemble the united states for geographic and other reasons. the russian empire in the soviet union were not accidental. they bound together economically and political regions that have mutual dependence. the vision of the liberals in russia and in the united states was that following the full
soviet union the reoriented themselves towards europe, the united states. they have to understand these countries couldn't compete in any reasonable time frame. more dependent they became one year of the weaker they became and that russia is a geopolitical entity. it experienced terrible wars in its history and it's extremely cautious about the expansion of things like nato. re nado as a military alliance. we regard it as a club of nice people. it is fairly mismatched. the united states moved into the baltics and they don't move into the baltics. as the orange revolution of ukraine took off and the united states became very influential of center alisa. the russians saw the second circle taking place. so they contained them to one was contained after world war ii. vladimir putin from the kgb
solve the second encirclement. the russians also put their economy, the stopped trying to get stolen to become a great industrial force. they came exporters of commodities, not only natural gas but -- >> host: they had, you know, their economy had been based on that even in the soviet times, writes? >> guest: but gas optimize toward that end. so -- >> host: they saw the collapse of their investment? >> guest: the sold collapse and the putin deliberately said we are not going to try to reinvest told us up. we are going to look at the gas problem but also grain exports, wood, the range of primary commodities and something we can do now. the dependencies and other countries contained by yet it contains advantages for us whereas under the strategy was to take these enterprises of these industrial enterprises and continue investing in them. putin made a fundamental change,
so there are two institutions that emerge in russia and the first part of the 21st century. the first was to provide fsb and the second was gas. and these institutions played off against each other to reassert the russian power and also to increase the leverage particularly of the europeans and the germans. >> host: i was struck by your argument that russia in the long term is weak but perhaps in the short term in the next decade or so may come once again to play a very significant role in terms of of obstructing u.s. goals. what you mean by that? what is the contradiction? >> guest: power is relative. within the former soviet union, russia is strong. europe is i won't say disarmed,
but certainly militarily weakened economically strong but has a heavy dependency on natural gas. there are ways the europeans can move beyond the dependency. but over the next ten years, they are going to require the russian resources. the germans have also reached a point within the european union they are asking basic questions about what is the use of this? de need workers. they don't want to have any more turkish workers. that is a problem to them. so you can have the workers come to the factories to move the factories to the workers. oddly enough even though russia has the declining population has surplus labor and others are unemployed or underemployed and welcome the technology. what happened here is russia and germany have increasingly intense economic relationships
political party in settle to the concert and political reasons and neither of them are happy with the world run by the united states. it creates a way to that i can address. germany isn't yet moved to this point. germany is still sorting for the wreckage of the e.u. deciding which way it's going to go. i suspect it has a stronger interest with russia at the moment. in the long run there was a reason that the soviet union collapsed and that reason hasn't run away. so if i look out longer and see those reasons and other weaknesses. but in the short run, given the state of the e.u., given the state of russia relative to the e.u. and the situation in the union, especially given the massive preoccupation of the united states on the middle east as opposed to europe russia tries to stabilize itself and is doing fairly well.
>> host: let's talk about the middle east. what does the middle east tell about the forecasting in the dangers of expecting what we think is the conventional wisdom today? >> guest: first you have to define the middle east. when i speak about the area of the united states engaged in, i think about the mediterranean. from israel -- this is different from north africa. >> host: the greater middle east you're talking about? >> guest: some people use the middle east to include any islamic country. some people use it for arabs. it's a british term for the office and has a great deal of use. i'm interested in the area where the united states is waging war which is iraq, afghanistan, to some extent pakistan, possibly iran. the three balances of power in that region, the arab-israeli,
iran-iraqi and the indo-pakistani. each one of them have been destabilized of the ten years. in the arab-israeli relationships, barring some dramatic change of egypt over time, israel is so dominant that it can create new realities on the ground and there is indifference to what the united states releases very often. in afghanistan, the united states is asking pakistan to do things to create stability that we can pakistan that should create independent regional power in india that the united states may not appreciate. and of the course the invasion of iraq to destroy the power creating what is the most immediate issue which is for getting nuclear weapons iran is the dominant conventional military force in the region if the united states is there the united states has in its policy the withdraw from iraq, iran filling the vacuum is extremely
high. that in turn to the qtr changes the balance of power or the political dynamic in the arabian peninsula. they are vitally important decisions to be made. on the one hand, the united states must rebalanced the global policy to deal with issues like russia, to deal with china and so on. at the same time the united states can simply withdraw. it doesn't have the ability to send the exit and it doesn't have an end game in any of these areas, so we have a very powerful nation, much less powerful than any other circumstances because so off-balance and over committed to one region. >> host: how are we in the times of your taking the consequences of that analysis, let's take those three that you mentioned in india, pakistan, iraq, iran and israel and palestine. in all three cases i think you have gone out and looked at some
ways in which we might end up in different places than we are now with this really would call strategic distancing from israel, not their rejection of israel, but the prioritizing of the efforts in the israel palestine conflict. india pakistan, i think that is where i was most surprised to read your book. right now there is a lot of talk in washington in particular about the strategic prospect of a potentially invigorated alliance with president obama just made the big trick last fall and this falls on bush's foreign policy emphasis on building a new substantively different kind of relationship with india and really after the enormous disappointment of the long term partnership we have a partnership with pakistan it seems to have failed in some
respects. but i definitely want to get back to that and of course your fear. but you look at is iran, iraq, the destabilization caused by the u.s. invasion of iraq and your recommendation that ultimately we are going to have to find the nixon and china moment where no matter how unpalatable it may seem we come to some different kind of accommodation or even a new alliance with iran. so let's take those three. israel and palestine first. >> guest: we are committed to the survival of israel. it is something that's not an issue. if you're on what to build a nuclear weapon, which the israelis say is now three to five years out, that's another issue. but the current circumstances is not the survival of israel. in 197374 their it was. and at that time, we gave $3 billion which was 25% of its gdp, which today is 1.5% of its
gdp. the relationship itself is changed. it's not the issue it's not the eight we provide is not critical. it's not so much that i want to change the relationship, the relation to this change. the question now is we have one set of relations 27 -- 1967. there was the second period let's quit 67 until recently where the united states and israel had the partnership at the kidding changing the partnership i'm wondering what are we partnering on? israel's of you is it must create a reality on the ground on which settlements, institutions and so on that control the palestinians put in place and that sort of negotiation as possible.
the united states has an interest in the stability in the region, not necessarily be is really a solution to that. the idea that the united states is simply tracked whichever is really government comes into power is what is to benefit for the united states there's intelligence sharing with israel that will continue because israel needs it. redefining the relationship is not that somebody at a think tank publishes a paper and says he is a wonderful idea and that applies to the other regions as well. it is a recognition that the relationship has changed, the terms of endearment if you will are still there but not what they were before, and adjusting to policy satisfactorily at the time when the united states is so bogged down elsewhere. >> host: what are the jewels in the toolkit for making this adjustment? i think it's an important one.
>> guest: the first is recognizing their relationship has changed already. it's not your tool kit that changed. the only thing your tool kits can do is a gesture policy that you're facing at this moment or potentially facing the future. >> host: that is what is so striking. to have barack obama coming into office speaking in a different manner about the challenges in the middle east, certainly than president bush had before him, and i think what has been interesting to observe the last couple of years is in the end obama until now hasn't managed a major shift. >> guest: and its crucial which is the speeches are - and nothing to do with them making the fortune heiress. >> host: but they often don't translate per se into policy shifts or the rebalanced -- >> guest: which is why i'm not really interested in the foreign policy. obama is a perfect example. a person who genuinely want a different foreign policy and was
unable to do. it's equally interesting to look to george bush. to what extent did he really have the option that we like to do? like to view our presidents with magical powers that they make decisions in a vacuum and create policies and people who speak to the president or semi magical and so on, so forth. i live in austin texas to avoid demagogues of washington. it's extremely important to understand how little choice obama had. the relationship george w. bush had with chancellor merkel wasn't on the fact that george w. bush allowed then, it was seized on the fact germany as a nation has interests as they do not fully coincide any longer with those of the united states. it's impossible to pretend we are in the middle of the cold war in this relationship to
exist, and if you take that president and put a different president in regardless with the intent tensions are he's going to wind up with the same relationship and it's not a personal relationship, it's not that they get along or they don't get along or the like each other. germany is a nation of many tens of millions of people in the united states and the president is the end product of that, but he leads best when he's going to the place you're going anyway. obama is perhaps a critic in the limited foreign policy. you can turn their rhetoric and to many volumes of position papers and policy papers. his assumption at the beginning was that u.s. and german relations could have been with the work 20 years ago had not been for the unilateralism of george w. bush.
it was written like this, obama's position was i will be much more pleasant person and therefore, the germans will do much more to help. thank god we finally have a president who would ask us to do things we don't want to do the had this tremendous love affair and the nobel peace prize and everything else and suddenly you realize my goodness, barack obama is an american president and angela merkel is a german chancellor. >> host: i would like to go back to one of your earlier point which is what does it mean for the united states to grow into accepting its role as a sort of a global empire issue in a horse since and to actually make the case that in pa year requires a much more sophisticated foreign policy in which to operate through a regional alliances and even sort
of networks of much more sophisticated ways of looking at what is happening there of the world to accomplish rather than just the sheer exercise of force or hard power if you will. you could argue that in some way that is what barack obama set out to do in the world. his embrace of multilateralism was in their view only certainly an effort to rebalanced the world where the simple projection of the american force -- >> guest: three balancing of the world and the president as an engineer. prior to that, they're has to be sophistication of understanding of the impersonal forces. >> host: what are the national interests? >> guest: where the national interests? what are the things authors cannot agree to? what are things they must have? it is the central foreign policy be built on the constraints. its own constraints, understanding what it is you cannot give up, what you must
have, understanding the other people paso the idea of building alliances takes place in a vacuum that you simply reach out as the problem the problem is within the confines of the reality of the foreign policy is possible to manage, it isn't possible to abolish that. so when the british dominated india the reengineered it in a way but by taking an advantage of the pensions and balance of power in that area in the troops and try to take it over. similarly the united states had the option in the middle east to manage the existing relationships. what are the existing relationships, what are the needs and requirements? and i think one of the things that obama had to learn if he's learned it is the good will, the
insufficient. you have to understand the limits and constraints that's what makes forecasting a certain extent possible. i certainly can't predict what humor barack obama would make in the morning and what initiatives he would undertake. i can talk about what would fail because the other side can't possibly agree to that. understand those things that tie the issues together. so whether putin is there or is not, russia is an exporter of natural gas. >> host: let's look at the to even as we talk about that really have shaped the last decades of the geopolitics, neither of which were very predictable or certainly were predictable by the vast majority of the experts, the breakup of the soviet union in 1991 and the attack of september 11th. you could have said al qaeda represented an actual threat to
carry out dramatic and homeland. they had done so already in 1993. he would have been really out there on a limb and i'm not sure anyone was predicting that sheer force of the international affairs in the first decade of the 21st century. the same for the brick of the soviet union. there were those who accurately diagnosed the internal just as there are those today who are diagnosing the international route across the regimes of the world. >> guest: which is why it is easier to forecast than 100 years. >> host: we've been waiting for the collapse of the castro regime in cuba for quite some time. >> guest: it was impossible to imagine the british defeated by the american surges. when we look back on the british history and the 19th and 20th century it's not a critical event. over the long run, certain of things that are of enormous
importance shrink to an sycophants. it was such an enormous event in american history look back in the context even today it has a lesser significance in terms of what will happen. you begin the conversation saying i've gone from a more ambitious to a lesser and vicious. >> host: it might be harder to do that in your prediction. >> guest: it's easier to look forward 100 years, blanking out the unexpected things and looking at the main thrusts. you may be wrong but that's possible. at the beginning of the 20th century as i had written the book i had wished i'd had written of the collapse of the empire, the mass of the warfare, and things of that sort without getting into the specifics and in fact h. g. wells and others, lenin wrote about all those
things. what i try to do is understand what happens the next 100 years and what is now the driving force, the demographics, some more political and so on. i wanted to come back into the ten year framework because there is a point at which this has to play out. it has to begin playing out, and this is a point where policy and history meet each other not in the neat way of policy makers, but in the more complex way of policy in countering and emergency reality and that is really what i wanted to do with this book. i wanted to see the hard part, where i think i take a look at the 9/11 and so what does this decade mean. i am making the argument that in the and this wasn't a powerful war. i chose the bubble war as an exhibit from the standpoint of
the politics of the time, it was an enormously noisy thing, as it was the war of 1998. in retrospect, it was a fairly passive thing. when i look at what happened and 9/11 i would put it this way. when the soviet union collapsed, the dividing line in the islamic world shattered and the region from yugoslavia was thrown off balance. a massive earthquake took place. the first earthquake was in yugoslavia which was regarded as a kind of -- it had nothing to do with it but it was actually a precursor to a massive destabilization, the united states with moderate force 150,000 men for 320 million countries, not massive went in and made the situation less ideal than it would have been
otherwise. nevertheless, the question is what is the lasting effect on this? well, you could see the number of ways. al qaeda's goal was to trigger a series of uprisings, complete dillinger. the american goal as we understand was to create a series of pro-american regimes, preferably with the government governing in this region iraq was the case. well, that didn't happen. it's remarkable to me about the region is how it's changed us. >> host: that is where we are going to see is this really the sort of very, very long in the game of the client states of the soviet versus the u.s. era and we don't have the sense yet of what is going to replace that certainly across the middle east. are we seeing not the beginning of the next, but of the very
long in the game of the last states. >> host: >> guest: it becomes what do you really want for india. >> host: that is exactly where i was going to go. i have to say why are you down on the idea of the u.s. indian alliance when you look at the context of china and the strategic and the notion and the genuine repeated failures of the policy of supporting pakistan. >> guest: certainly we will have a long-term relationship with india. relations with foreign countries is always enhanced by having the letters against them in addition to positive things for them. the balance of power means that you do not make a unilateral on condition commitment to any country. you understand the defined interests in common as always essential as a lesser power and
we have other options. becoming in the interrelationship with the power, that is unconditional goes against the principal of the prudent foreign policy. how do you condition our relationship with india and given the geography it's hard. china appears to be all the wit isn't. it's far away over the hill. the american relationship with pakistan is the only lever that is available. do we want the content under the symbol power whatever it is i think it's more interest of the united states to have a relationship with the country that has securities. so when we talk about a sophisticated foreign policy, it doesn't sidley me and diplomats who speak the language to read it means understanding of the relationship with the foreign country is extraordinarily complex.
it isn't monochromatic. they are enemies. they consist of conflicting interests, and when i look at any country and i asked two questions talkative benefit the united states, how can it be made clear that there are alternatives so the dependency doesn't exist? so the issue here is and shall we have a close relationship with india because we share the common interest economic, political and military, the question is how do we shape that relationship, and i think one of the problems the united states has is in terms of friends and enemies. this is a friend and i want to be generous think it has a business relationship. i have a business relationship with this person. i may or may not be his friend. that has nothing to do with it, and i want to make sure i have
options. and if you would be more healthy if we were to place the framework of the u.s. release in countries to depersonalize it. >> host: what exactly what has been going on with pakistan is we have in fact need our dependency so clear with them, and actually they have the sense that our strategic calculation in the region is what you just outlined that we prefer to have a friendly relationship -- >> guest: we can have relations with pakistan and india at the same time it's possible. >> host: but we have tried this strategic approach to the region in a way that you're suggesting and it hasn't worked out very well. >> guest: if you look at period of time that we are talking about in 1948, not too uncomfortable with the way that it's evolved, certainly our invasion of afghanistan has created a problem with pakistan that threatens its internal stability they look back in the
1990's period as a period where they were doing with the americans wanted. it was a period of relative stability, but that isn't our concern. we come back and say but the al qaeda developed in afghanistan and we didn't want that and they come back and said well yes they did and that's unfortunate, but al qaeda could have developed anywhere else al qaeda was at an afghan movement. it happened to be there. the point we ask now is how do we deal with this. the united states is a temporary presence in afghanistan. whether it is one year or five years we are not going to be there permanently. pakistan is permanent interest in afghanistan. it does not want to have a hostile afghanistan. therefore what it wants to or not it has to take responsibility for afghanistan. the american goal is that al qaeda should not be in afghanistan in yemen, somalia and cleveland.
>> host: if you look at south asia do you disagree with those who consider pakistan and the afghanistan to unstable part of the world? >> guest: iran is potentially more but it's not worth having. the question is how do we get it back into shape. destabilizing pakistan to the point of collapse i don't think would create the security making it a responsibility of pakistan, which we don't make it, it is, is an interesting outcome. the problem is that we have to ask the more fundamental question why are we in afghanistan? what was the strategy that president obama had in mind? president bush's strategy was a more modest one of holding the key areas and not really trying
to dominate the country. president obama redican knorr doing in the wrong war. we are now in this war. it's not clear we have the forces necessary to bring this conclusion. therefore, we are stuck with pakistan because we withdraw in this case pakistan, or we entice her pakistan in various ways into collaborating in a staged withdrawal, so this comes to the point that there really doesn't matter if what happened in the past at this moment, if our goal list to somehow exit afghanistan without attempting, we must deal with pakistan. who else can we -- >> host: that's right. the question isn't so much dealing with pakistan with is the longer-term out, in terms of are they going to come away from wherever we end up with a new status quo in afghanistan we
committed to their campaign of undermining their neighbor next door in india. >> guest: that is exactly the choice. we can avoid that by staying in afghanistan permanently. or live with it. so here is exactly how i approach a foreign policy issue. if pakistan comes to be secure in afghanistan to destabilize india. shall we therefore see permanent in afghanistan? how do we prevent that? where i come to stay yes, pakistan and india have reasons to distrust each other. i don't think they are going to go away. i think at various points in history they will attempt to undermine it. how can the united states benefit from that? how can it create a stable balance and what american interests are secure? those who say pakistan is not going to be trusted, i ask the
question okay, so what is your plan? and the problem is that we have a -- nado has 150,000 troops fighting in afghanistan. i regard that as an on attainable position. i see no solution except within the context of a pakistani relationship. therefore, i regard can we trust pakistan i don't know what to do with it because i see our country as having decisions and mike this is a realist or an idealist position, this is simply the way we played cards that have let us. can we get india to stop undermining pakistan and pakistan to stop undermining india. that we don't know how to do it one of the problems is when you make your foreign policy that ambitious i don't simply want to
-- >> host: the failure is much higher -- >> guest: and leave yourself in afghanistan. more sufficient having the 150 those in the troops out i'm not particularly interested in national interest of the united states what kind of government there is in trouble and i want to see the united states more balanced and able to respond to invasions of georgia and things of that sort, so i want to balance the foreign policy. afghanistan creates an unbalanced foreign policy my question is how do i rebalanced. >> host: one thing you haven't talked about so far is a china and when you have a conversation about india and pakistan, the big piece of that that we haven't talked about at all is china. you are of the view that it is occurring almost hysteria about the rise of china and will be for the long-term consequence of
american power has been broadly overstated in the u.s.. tell me why you think that. >> guest: to begin with, using statistics there are 1.3 billion people in china. 600 million of them live in households earning less than $3 a day. 440 million live in households earning between 36 -- three to $6 a day. china over 80% lives in poverty in the sub-saharan africa. there is a china that we don't see that about has 60 million people and an average income of $20,000 a year, a middle class standards which is the size of france. it's not a trivial number but it's lost in 5% of china. that china cannot sell to china. they are trying to find ways to do it. you cannot sell an ipad to a person earns $3 a day. they are the hostage of the west, and the gun pointing at the head of china because every
dollar not spend at wal-mart is taken out of the chinese. the chinese are trying to stabilize by increasing exports. the current profit margin finances one plight 7% on the chinese exports which i think is high. >> host: even the chinese officials will tell you not to believe the statistics. >> guest: which means they are exported almost cost in order to prevent the thing they are afraid of, unemployment. they can't keep that because at this point, the chinese rates are higher than those of mexico. if you take a look at [inaudible] china lost its competitive that vantage. like japan in 1990 when we all believe in the massive japanese superstates taking us all over, and we saw them by rockets on
the center. >> host: [inaudible] >> guest: japan has come through a 20 year period in which it achieved its economic goals. it had a truce between having the crunching recession, unemployment and of violating the social contract that underlines the japanese society, which is you get a job that a company and stay at that company. they made a strategic decision made the decision as we would have lower interest rates, keep the businesses going and avoid unemployment. from the standpoint of the western investors this was the long-lost decade because we couldn't invest in japan. >> host: it wasn't growing. guest with the japanese said we haven't realized the purpose of japan was to give you the opportunity to make money. they achieved what they wanted and this is one of the important things to talk about with sophistication. understand what the japanese were afraid of, on employment, then you can understand why the
policy wasn't stupid. it made perfect sense. they are now reaching the end of the cycle. the debt level has reached the point is probably unsustainable. they are going to have to make fundamental changes in their policy. and i think is going to unleash growth and the social instability. but that being said, they have one advantage that china doesn't. they don't have 1 billion people in third world poverty. china does. and the chinese are bitterly aware of that, which is why they are increasing security crackdowns everywhere, maneuvering the liberation army, having the crisis and secession as we just saw and also investing anywhere in the world outside of china. i had a joke when japan came, japanese were doing so well wire the body in pebble beach? if the chinese are doing so spectacular why are they making massive investments outside of china? in the two previous asian
crises, the japanese in 1997 east asian crisis, the precursor yvette was capital. money moving out of those markets and investing overseas. we are now in the middle of the chinese capital flight which the media is interpreting as the growing power of china. the simple point is they are making a rational investment decisions based on their fear of the future of the chinese economy between all of these various forces. >> host: to be precise, is it your sense that the projections of the continued economic growth are overstated? do you not believe china will surpass the u.s. as the largest economy sometime in the next decade or so? >> guest: compounding at ten to 12% is fairly difficult to believe. remember that china came from a position where the economy was in complete shambles. the first two decades of growth
were simply reconstructing. an economy with the resources and everything else. the last decade was brilliant economic planning. but in the same way that you can't invest on the assumption is you always have the same compound and rates the chinese have to make a readjustment in the growth rate, and they are doing it and they are doing it very carefully. and this is why you can ask them to evaluate any amount you want, they are not going to do it. it's not that china is between collapse and greatness. like japan, who is in a similar situation, there is a readjustment of the normal. and japan went from the high growth economy, massively exporting and so on, to a different structural kind driven by financial problems,
non-performing loans in particular. china is in that situation as well. i'm getting to the question of death and driven and equity driven economies and so, but the point is it is not an insult to china to say you've had a magnificent 30 years. the next 30 probably would look exactly the same. host glisson the projections suggest the rate of growth is going to go under the double digits that it has been at for certainly the last decade or so. the would still leave china on the course to become the world's dominant economy. >> guest: 8% growth this extraordinary, and i don't think it is at 8% right now, and it's possible for the economy to grow at any great if it is indifferent to the rate of return on capital. and that is where the chinese are right now. if i have a company and i am selling my product and low-cost, i can have them pass through rates of growth just before i go bankrupt, and that's what happened with of the japanese. the huge rates of growth in '88, '89, '90.
but at low rates on the capitol because the national settlement want to shut them down. so the chinese had that situation. this is why the margins on exports are so important. they have the rate of growth that isn't necessarily healthy. >> host: they also have a new lead it's a jury important fact which is a space crisis not only because of the sheer scale of the people who live in, you know, really difficult third world conditions of poverty but also the one child policy, and you are looking at, you know, the disappearance of this enormous youth generation to power growth in the long term. >> guest: as much of that there is a cliff between the risk. as china becomes a more sophisticated economy, producing more sophisticated products, the level of education and the expertise required to join that blocks out third world peace and
they can't rise. the real question in china [inaudible] he is tempted to rise in shanghai. he marched and raised an army and the peasants were bitter. they came back over 20 years and restructured china. the chinese, and it is painfully aware of how they began which is why they are ruthlessly crushing any organization outside of the party. they are not allowing anything to rise. if the chinese enter a period which i think the are, then the question isn't really economic. the question is social and political. what happens. and i think the chinese are aware of that and their use -- that is why the several members of the army are going to be in senior positions now. the chinese are aware of that and trying to whether it. they made, but for now the
chinese are very concerned with how to manage the current problem. in their view they are confident they can manage it, perhaps they can but it's not read b.c.. >> host: basically what you're seeing is here in the west in the economic analyst and the overall has missed the underlining potential of the political instability in china. it's not front and center. if you look at not just american the the european analysis of china today it is all that jealousy of the growth figures. it's not about being the risk of political instability. >> guest: there is an interesting social phenomenon. in 1993, 94, with japan and the rate slowdown, there was still people writing articles on the japanese. the have a treat for your lack of between the economic reality and